Sergey V. Popov

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I'm currently working as a Senior Lecturer in the Cardiff Business School. I am working mostly in the fields of applied micro and econometrics, I invent models, quantify their predictions and test their consistency with the data. My most recent CV is here.

Research supervision: I am eager to supervise PhD students in many topics (from international trade to social choice to corruption to mechanism design), but my specialty is in applied micro theory. If you have a research idea, write to me, I try to reply to all the emails I get.

News and Plans

Current Research (more)

Leadership in Scholarship: Editors' Influence on the Profession's Narrative

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With Ali Sina Önder and Sascha Schweitzer. Full text, AER topic loadings in time (and calculation of proportion of topics that exhibit trends), visualization of topcs in our data.

Academic journals disseminate new knowledge, and therefore can influence the direction and composition of ongoing research by choosing what to publish. We study the influence of editors and coeditors of the American Economic Review (AER) on the topic structure of papers published in the AER between 1976 and 2013 using a textual analysis of manuscripts. We compare AER's topic structure to that of the other top general interest journals. The appointment of new AER editors, while accompanied by a minor comovement of AER topics towards topics of editor's post-appointment publications, serves more to premediate trends in the other Top 5 journals. Presented at:

Same Sex Marriage, The Great Equalizer

With Aleksey Parakhonyak. Full text.

We demonstrate the abundance of asymmetric equilibria in a standard marriage market model, when agents must only engage in heterosexual marriage: agents of different gender are not guaranteed to have the same payoff even under equal opportunities, even if all other factors, such as own type or the distribution of partner types, are same across genders. Then we allow for same-sex marriage, and we demonstrate that under equal opportunities, when genders are symmetrical, only symmetric equilibria survive. Presented at: